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BOOK REVIEW
Le droit de l'int6gration 6conomique
socialiste
Reviewed by Dominique Carreau*
R. BYSTRICKY, LE DROIT DE L'INT7tGRATION ACONOMIQUE SOCIALISTM; Sijthoff &
Noordhoff, Leiden, The Netherlands (1979); available in the United States
from Kluwer Boston, Inc., 190 Old Derby St., Hingham, Mass. 02043; $48.00;
ISBN 90-286-0339-5; xii, 471 pp.; footnotes, appendix, bibliography, index.
In Le droit de l'int~gration 6conomique socialiste Professor Bys-
tricky critically analyzes the theory and practice of the socialist economic
integration. Regional economic integration is a prominent feature of con-
temporary international relations. Small- or medium-sized nations form
regional groups in order to create a large market for their goods. Produc-
ers capable of doing so will expand their production when such a market
is available, and lower costs of production will result because of econo-
mies of scale. Therefore, more goods will be available in the regional mar-
ket at lower prices, and the producers will be more competitive in the
world market as well. Continental-size states such as Brazil, China, India,
the United States, and the U.S.S.R., enjoy a marked advantage over
smaller nations. For small- and medium-sized nations the choice is crystal
clear-either they form regional economic groups with their neighbors or
they will have no economic clout in the world. The framers of the post-
World War II international trade charters fully recognized this choice and
saw the necessity of regional economic groupings. Thus, article XXIV of
the G.A.T.T. 1 expressly legitimizes international economic integrations,
provided they take the form of either free trade areas or customs unions
and that they adhere to certain principles designed to make them trade
creating and not trade diverting.
2
Regional economic integrations are numerous. No continent has re-
mained unaffected by the move toward unification. Regardless of their
* Dominique Carreau is a Professor of Law at the University of Paris I, and a member
of the Board of Advisors of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. xxiv, 61 Stat. Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
2. Id. The distinction between trade creating and trade diverting was made famous by
U.S. economist Jacob Viner in the 1950's. See generally J. ViNmi, THE CUSTOMS UNION IS-
SUE (1950).
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level of development or their domestic economic or political organization,
most nations are members of some kind of regional economic group. How-
ever, not all economic groups are alike. In this respect, a basic distinction
must be drawn between groups formed solely for economic cooperation
and those which reflect true economic integration. True integration im-
plies a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the group's members,
whereas economic cooperation does not imply such a surrender of sover-
eignty. It is not surprising that relatively few regional groups based on
the concept of strict economic integration between member states have
been formed. Nations are usually reluctant to give up their sovereignty
even if that surrender of power is limited to the economic sphere. More-
over, regional integrations cannot be exclusively circumscribed to eco-
nomic matters, and the formation of any regional group entails obvious
political consequences. It is no secret that the fathers of the European
economic reconstruction after World War II desired a political integration
of Europe as well as an economic one. In setting up economic integration
institutions' they pursued the goal, some would say the dream, of politi-
cal integration. They hoped that some sort of "United States of Europe"
would evolve.4 Ever since, within the European Economic Community
(EEC), Member States and theoreticians have been divided over the issue
of integration; some favor a "supranational" Europe, e.g., organized on
the model of a federal state, and some favor a "Europe of States," e.g., an
organization in which each member retains as many sovereign powers as
possible.5
Eastern European socialist countries also formed a regional economic
organization shortly after World War IIs to help solve their economic
problems. The organization, commonly known as COMECON,' was very
inactive during the first two decades or so of its existence. The turning
point for COMECON came with the adoption in 1971 of a voluminous
"Comprehensive Program for the further deepening and perfecting of co-
operation and development of the socialist economic integration between
participating members." Professor Bystricky's book, and this constitutes
its principal merit, forcefully demonstrates the uniqueness of the socialist
integration. COMECON is radically different from the EEC despite some
outward similarities.
Professor Bystricky's main line of argument is that political consider-
ations are responsible for the economic integration of socialist countries,
3. Such institutions include EURATOM, the European Coal and Steel Community and
the European Economic Community.
4. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAW
COUNTRIES: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970); R. PRYCE, THE POLITICS OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1973).
5. See W.F. FELD, TRANSNATIONAL BUSIrNSS COLLABORATION AMONG COMMON LAW
CouNTRucs: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION (1970).
6. R. BYSTmCKY, LE DROrr DE L'IN TGRATION *CONOMIQUE SOCIALiSTE 7 (1979).
7. This acronym stands for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
8. R. BySTRICKY, supra note 6, at 8.
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while the Treaty of Rome9 creating the EEC primarily relies on private
economic forces and interests to achieve a "common market." Whether
the factor responsible for integration is governmental fiat or private eco-
nomic forces, economic and political factors cannot remain isolated. The
author correctly remarks that the economic achievements of COMECON
countries remain disappointing if compared to those attained in the West,
while the EEC, albeit an economic success, has more or less come to a
halt for lack of political will to achieve a greater degree of integration.
Professor Bystricky attributes the impressive political achievements of
the socialist community to the leadership of the Communist Party in each
country. The Communist Party represents a real "supranational power"
that is presently missing within the ten-nation EEC.
Among the main sources of COMECON regional law are the general
laws of socialist construction which provide for the collective ownership
of all means of production, strict economic planning, democratic central-
ism, state monopoly of foreign trade, and the dominant role of the Com-
munist Party.10 However, it is the Soviet Union's interpretation of social-
ism which is considered to be the true embodiment of these general
principles. Thus, Professor Bystricky maintains that the COMECON
structure is imposed on its member states by the Soviet Union in order to
foster its own political and military interests, and that COMECON's gen-
eral underlying principles conveniently aid the Soviet Union in dominat-
ing its smaller socialist partners. All deviations from the Soviet view of
socialism may be crushed by relying on the omnipresent and pervading
principle of "socialist internationalism." According to this principle, all
national interests must be subordinated to those of the workers' interna-
tional revolutionary movement." Thus, when the so-called socialist
"achievements" are threatened in a given COMECON member state, the
socialist community has the right, if not the obligation, to intervene even
by military means to protect such gains.1 2 Hence, the Soviet interventions
in Berlin in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
COMECON members possess only a limited sovereignty which must bow
in case of conflict to the general laws of socialist construction as these
laws are superior to the national laws within the countries of the Commu-
nist bloc. 8 This position is maintained notwithstanding the recognized
principle of international law of the sovereign equality of states. One can
agree with the author when he points out that such a position is entirely
incompatible with the present state of international law. However, it
9. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for signature Nov.
23, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
10. R. BYSTRICKY, supra note 6, at 44-45.
11. Id. at 96-97.
12. Id. at 98.
13. Id. at 112. The substance of this doctrine was contained in a remark made by Leo-
nid Brezhnev in 1968. Alluding to the Soviet invasion of Hungary, he stated: "The U.S.S.R.
cannot be and will never be indifferent to the destiny of the socialist construction in other
countries or to the cause of world communism." Id.
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would have been interesting to raise the question of whether the limited
sovereignty concept could be viewed as a norm of jus cogens. This would
most likely be the socialist defense of this concept, but, in the mind of
this reviewer, such an assertion cannot be legally argued with persuasion.
Finally, it is sometimes difficult to agree with all the conclusions
reached by Professor Bystricky about the political and systemic aspects
of COMECON. For instance, he states that "the law of the mightiest is
the rule within the socialist community" '14 and implies that, in the years
to come, COMECON's smaller members will actually have a status analo-
gous to that of federated republics within the U.S.S.R. 15 These state-
ments constitute unwarranted conclusions that cannot be accepted.
Professor Bystricky is more perceptive when he draws attention to
the double-talk phenomenon which so puzzles Westerners and which
mars their comprehension of socialist institutions. For instance, when one
reads COMECON's constitutive instruments, one has the impression that
what the framers had in mind was to create an institution based simply
on cooperation among members rather than an institution with suprana-
tional organs whose purpose is economic and political integration. The
author aptly demonstrates that the way COMECON actually operates is
entirely different from the way its organizational instruments indicate it
should operate, and that one should not be confused by the official termi-
nology. Thus, a true integration is the purpose of COMECON, and its
policies are founded on supranationality principles even though this con-
cept was officially rejected by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.' To
illustrate his thesis, Bystricky points out the fact that COMECON-cre-
ated law is supreme over national law and sometimes becomes part of
national law with no other action on the part of the country, that some
important economic sectors are jointly planned, and that the unanimity
required in the COMECON decisionmaking process progressively became
fictitious and was phased out by the Comprehensive Program of 1971.17
Furthermore, as noted above, the leading role of the Communist Parties
and the common ideology in the COMECON nations together with the
"socialist internationalism" principle are instrumental in developing a so-
cialist community which does not recognize national boundaries, which is
truly supranational. Thus, the author reaches the paradoxical, albeit ac-
curate, conclusion that the Treaty of Rome creating the EEC enshrines a
supranationality principle, but its working has consistently been blocked
for lack of political will. On the other hand, COMECON's Comprehensive
Program of 1971 officially rejects all supranational references, but, in real-
ity, COMECON's evolution clearly shows that the socialist integration is
guided by the principle of supranationality.
14. Id. at 334.
15. Id. at 324.
16. Id. at 89.
17. Id. at 41-44.
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Equally puzzling for a Western lawyer is the legal nature of recom-
mendations adopted by COMECON organs. In theory, and in conformity
with the commonly accepted rules of international law, they are not bind-
ing on member states. According to Bystricky, they are similar to interna-
tional treaties or EEC regulations. To this reviewer, it would seem prefer-
able to equate them to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development council decisions that bind interested members only. The
fact is that COMECON recommendations constitute obligatory legal
norms for participating Member States.18
Professor Bystricky's book provides interested readers with a precise
and concise description of COMECON organs and accomplishments. Un-
fortunately, Professor Bystricky's treatment of East-West joint ventures
is brief and superficial, particularly in view of the fact that these joint
ventures represent one of the most promising modes of transideological
cooperation. Perhaps this treatment of the subject reflects the author's
deep-rooted feeling that economic integrations between socialist and capi-
talist nations are an impossible dream.
Finally, in his concluding remarks, Professor Bystricky touches upon
a controversial topic. He states that the COMECON nations have not
achieved true socialism but have only copied the Soviet Union's version
of socialism which would be described by some as state capitalism and by
others, including this reviewer, as the kind of oriental despotism analyzed
by Karl Marx. 9 Bystricky's further criticisms of the socialist system and
COMECON are equally unflattering. The tone is set, and it is not
dispassionate.
18. Id. at 34-40.
19. Id. at 338.
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